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Abstract: 
This paper examines various schools of trade policy reform and finds little difference 
between them in regards their essential export optimism.  This optimism is based on 
an unwarranted assumption in cross-country empirical studies.  In practise the 
increasing number of large LDC’s shifting towards export promotion since the 1980s 
is found to coincide with declining terms of trade for labour-intensive manufactures.  
So far this decline has been offset by growth in volume.  The positive relation is 
actually dependent on market growth in developed countries rather than domestic 
policy reform.  Marx (the Moor) provides a useful framework in which to analyse this 
process.  His analysis of competition and accumulation within a national economy is 
transposed to that of international trade.  Finally, the increasing integration of capital 
into ‘value chains’ and the formation of regional trading blocs can be related to the 
crisis tendencies of competition and the erosion of profit margins. 
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Introduction 
 
Export optimism is a widespread orthodoxy among trade economists.  Criticisms do 
not tend to question the gains from free trade, which are generally accepted, but rather 
their size.  Trade pessimists are likely to suggest these are small and less than 
alternative policy interventions.  Others argue free trade needs to be supplemented by 
active policies to promote exports. 
 
There are three loose schools to policy reform, titled here the ‘minimalist’, ‘market 
conforming’ and ‘governing the market’.  The first believes exports are best promoted 
through removing impediments to the free market; the second that exports are 
determined exogenously by factor endowments, policy can help realise this 
underlying potential or even exert an independent influence on trade outcome; the 
third that export structure can be endogenously determined by strategic government 
policy.  Fundamentally there is little difference between the three approaches, each 
argues that a greater volume of exports from developing countries is both desirable 
and possible.  All three schools do make a passing acknowledgement to the need for 
developed countries to liberalise markets especially in agriculture and textiles, to 
ensure growing market access for developing countries. 
 
The various studies used to provide empirical backing for the three schools have been 
based on an unwarranted premise – that of ceteris paribus.  Openness is demonstrated 
as being beneficial with the assumption that all else is constant, other economies 
remaining closed or open.   The true counterfactual is of closed economies moving 
simultaneously towards openness and export promotion.  This accords with the 
evidence of a general shift to openness since the 1980s.   
 
A generalisation of the export experience of the East Asian countries is argued by 
Cline (1982) to imply politically unacceptable levels of developed market penetration 
by LDC exports.  The optimistic outlook suggests that continued reliance on natural 
resource intensive exports for some LDC’s, growing south-south trade and less 
reliance on trade among large LDC’s will mitigate risks of politically unacceptable 
market penetration.  The increasing number of large LDC’s shifting towards export 
promotion in the 1980’s1 is found to coincide with a declining terms of trade for 
labour intensive manufactures.  This is the ‘fallacy of composition’ which raises the 
possibility of immiserising growth.  So far most studies find declining terms of trade 
have been offset by an increasing volumes of exports. Optimists have implicitly 
turned attention from the (LDC) domestic policy reform beloved of the World Bank, 
and posit a positive relation now dependent on domestic market growth in developed 
countries. 
 
Late industrialising economies rely on learning rather than innovation, Amsden (1989, 
2001).  Firms and countries seek to upgrade production to earn rents in less 
competitive market niches.  The process is a dynamic one, a race to upgrade faster 
than rivals, and profits being continually eroded as early leads fade away.  Marx 
analysed the dynamics of competition that compel capitalists to invest in new methods 
of production.  In this context we can directly link export promotion and declining 
terms of trade.  There is a curious contradiction in the literature.  Policies to increase 
                                                          
1 Often through the auspices of World Bank sponsored structural adjustment programmes. 
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competition and atomisation, to increase the export orientation (share of output 
exported) of individual economies are held to coincide with general export growth 
(higher volume).  Marx noted that greater levels of production and innovation are 
typically associated with greater centralisation and concentration of capital.   
 
Marx argued the dynamic of over-accumulation and crisis is the specific mechanism 
through which new methods of production are introduced and generalised within the 
capitalist system.  This generates a historical tendency to centralisation and 
concentration of capital, in order to reduce crises by reducing competition. 
 
We can identify two tendencies in the world economy and better explain them within 
the framework of falling terms of trade, growing centralisation of capital and the 
stirrings of a developing world response.  The increasing integration of capital into 
‘value chains’ and the formation of regional trading blocs, can be related to the crisis 
tendencies of competition for rents and the erosion of profit margins. 
 
And this is where we can explain the somewhat enigmatic alternative title.  The 
‘Moors Last Sigh’, does of course posit a new relevance for Marx (the Moor), this 
time transposing his analysis of competition and accumulation within a national 
economy to that of international trade. 
 
“When I started researching this biography, many friends looked at me with pity and 
incredulity.  Why, they wondered, would anyone wish to write about – still less read 
about – such a discredited, outmoded irrelevant figure?  I carried on regardless; and 
the more I studied Marx, the more outstandingly topical he seemed to be…….” 
(Wheen, 1999, p4). 
 
 
Orthodoxy: Export Promotion 
 
‘Export optimism’, is claimed by many to be the orthodoxy, 
 
“It is now widely accepted that growth prospects for developing countries are greatly 
enhanced through an outward orientated trade regime and fairly uniform incentives 
(primarily through the exchange rate) for production across exporting and import-
competing goods.” (Krueger, 1997, p1). 
 
Krueger (1998) goes further, she suggests there is no longer a need to debate the 
question, export optimism is effectively a closed issue.  We should turn attention to 
how so many had been deluded for so long by the false siren calls of import 
substitution, learn from failure:- failure in theory, in interpretation, in communication 
and in policy formulation. 
 
 
Evidence 
 
Perhaps the most widely cited studies extolling the merits of free trade are those of 
Dollar (1992) and Sachs and Warner (1995).  The former constructing an ‘index of 
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free trade’ based on distortion and variability in the real exchange rate and the latter a 
binary index to describe a country as open or closed based on four criteria. 
 
Rodriquez and Rodrik (2000) made a valiant effort at iconoclasm.  Changes in the 
exchange rate and hence Dollars’ distortion index were due not to ‘trade policy’ but to 
macroeconomic policy, monetary, fiscal and exchange rate policies.  The index 
captured the effects of macro instability on growth.  The openness index of Sachs and 
Warner (1995) was dominated by state monopoly and black market premia, which 
were in turn correlated with other determinants of economic growth, notably location 
in sub-Saharan Africa.  This index was reaching the somewhat disingenuous 
conclusion that growth in sub-Saharan Africa had been slow. 
 
A valiant attempt but for most little more than a footnoted curiosum.  Further studies 
have addressed the issues of robustness and endogeneity raised by Rodriquez and 
Rodrik.  Edwards (1998) found the positive relationship between openness and 
growth to be valid after testing the relationship between nine different indicators of 
trade policy.  Frankel and Romer (1999) and Onafowora and Owoge (1998) reached 
the same conclusions allowing for the possibility of reverse causation (endogeneity).  
 
There is little appetite in the literature to depart wholesale from ‘export optimism’, at 
most, a number of qualifications. 
 
The inherent difficulty of constructing an unambiguous index of ‘trade policy’ will 
always leave a residue of doubt that motivates an ongoing literature. Effort needs to 
be expended to test robustness, causality and whether the positive relationship is 
context dependent2.  The emphasis of debate has shifted, 
 
“there is a dirty little secret in international trade analysis.  The measurable costs of 
protectionist policies…the reductions in real income that can be attributed to tariffs 
and import quotas…are not all that large.” (Krugman, 1995, p31). 
 
Correspondingly Rodrik (2000) argues that integration cannot substitute for a 
development strategy.  When administrative and political capital are scarce, a clear 
sense of priority is needed.  A case in point being that the cost of implementing WTO 
obligations for a typical LDC to total $150m, and the return to such a sum being 
considerably higher were it to be invested in female education. 
 
Krueger as ever is unrepentent, 
 
“There is no doubt that the countries following outward orientated strategies grew 
faster.” (Krueger, 1998, p1515). 
 
Fundamentally the ‘dirty secret’ is a small one.  The debate has shifted from 
comparing the relative merits of import substitution and export promotion to debating 
just how beneficial is export promotion.  We are all optimists now, some only more so 
than others. 
 
                                                          
2 E.g. whether the positive relationship depends on rapid growth in world trade or low trade protection 
in developed countries. 
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Trade and Policy 
 
Within the framework of ‘export optimism’ there are three policy schools, the 
‘minimalist’, ‘market conforming’ and ‘governing the market’.  All share the idea that 
it is both desirable, possible and beneficial for LDCs to increase exports. 
 
 
Policy Reform 
 
The World Bank: A Legacy of Minimalism 
 
Policy reform especially with regards trade policy is seen by the World Bank 
primarily in terms of reducing state intervention.  Economic development of the 
rapidly growing Asian economies was associated with the rapid growth of 
manufactures.  Removing constraints on exporting will enable other countries to 
utilise a comparative advantage in labour-intensive production and emulate this feat. 
 
“The African countries undergoing structural adjustment have moved a long way 
toward good trade policies.  They have reduced administrative rationing of foreign 
exchange and eliminated many non-tariff barriers.  Yet they still have a long way to 
go…adjusters have not done enough to reduce the commercially orientated elements 
of protectionism – tariffs, non-tariff barriers, and industrial restrictions….” (World 
Bank, 1994, p61). 
 
 
Market Conforming Policy Intervention 
 
Market conforming intervention comes in variety of guises but is united by appeals to 
criteria such as ‘enabling’, ‘diversifying’, and ‘supporting’. 
 
An important theoretical framework for the analysis of market conforming 
intervention is that of comparative advantage.  In a model of endowment determined 
trade, the scope and composition of exports is an exogenously given variable, against 
which various impediments may exist.  Market conforming policy is about removing 
such impediments to realise the underlying potential3.  
 
Owens and Wood (1997) use a (modified) Heckscher-Ohlin model to explain the 
variation of trade shares in processed primary, unprocessed primary and 
manufacturing.  The scope of sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) to follow the manufactured 
export led growth of East Asia is limited, because they have the wrong resource 
endowments.  SSA has a low skill/ land ratio, giving it a comparative advantage in 
primary exports.  Wood and Meyer (1998) argue there is ample scope for policy to 
enable export growth in SSA based on diversification into new crops, fruit, flowers 
and vegetables4.  Only a quarter of the cultivable land in SSA is cultivated, SSA 
                                                          
3 Mosley (2000) notes that this debate pays insufficient attention to the need for intervention to correct 
for endogenous distortions in information, externalities, property rights and income distribution.  The 
only distortions in a market economy are not policy induced! 
4 By contrast raising relative skill (education) levels would be a long process. 
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currently fulfils only a small fraction of world demand so rapid output growth would 
have little impact on the world economy. 
 
Such projected reliance on primary exports runs into a critique of some historical 
stature.  Prebisch (1950) and Singer (1950) argued; there is a lower price and income 
elasticity of demand for primary than manufacturing goods; technical progress in 
developed countries leads to a secular decline in the use of primary raw materials in 
the manufacturing process.  This argument is commodity specific.  A shift from 
primary commodities to manufactures would lead to a secular gain in a countries 
terms of trade.  
 
 
Empirical Results  
 
Prebisch (1950) and Singer (1950) found the price ratio of non-fuel primary 
commodities and manufactures to be subject to a secular downward trend.  They 
found support for data on coffee, bananas, cocoa, tea and tobacco.  More recent 
studies have tended to support this conclusion5.  Thirlwall and Bergevin (1985) found 
the terms of trade moved against primary products between 1954-82.  Sapsford and 
Balasubramanyam (1999) found a downward and highly significant trend between 
1900 and 1992, with a marked increase in the trend depreciation and volatility of 
prices after 1972/3.  
 
Such elasticity pessimist arguments advise on both a theoretical and empirical basis 
for LDCs to diversify away from reliance on primary exports.  This more recent 
debate, combined with ‘export optimism’ emphasises diversifying the structure of 
exports rather than supporting a strategy of import substitution.  This is reinforced by 
other findings highlighting advantages of diversification. 
 
In 1980 seventy-five percent of all LDC exports were primary commodities, now 
around eighty percent are manufactures.  Africa by contrast is as dependent on a 
narrow range of primary exports as it was thirty years ago.  Collier (2002) finds 
primary commodity dependence to be associated with poor governance, corruption 
and a greater risk of civil war.  Continued dependence accounts for a large share of 
the differential performance between SSA and the rest of the world.   
 
Including exports as an additional argument in the production function Fosu (1996) 
found evidence that manufacturing exports exert a positive differential impact on 
GDP growth (independently of the terms of trade issue).  Manufactured exports 
provide greater economies of scale, greater backward and forward linkages with the 
rest of the economy6, and act as a more significant conduit of technological diffusion. 
 
Sri Lanka initiated market reforms in 1977 that transformed the existing ‘colonial’ 
trade structure.  Liberalisation allowed Sri Lanka to exploit a comparative advantage 
in unskilled labour, especially women who filled eighty percent of the jobs in the 
newly established export processing zones.  Such reform led to a secular improvement 
                                                          
5 A more extensive review of the relevant literature can be found in Mayer (2002).  The results 
presented there broadly support those discussed here. 
6 E.g. Hirschman (1958). 
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in the terms of trade7.  Between 1978 and 1997 manufactured exports grew at an 
annual rate of twenty percent, increasing their share in total merchandise exports from 
five to seventy percent.  The ratio of exports to gross output in domestic 
manufacturing from three percent in the late 1970s to seventy-two percent in the mid-
1990s.  There was a notable increase in exports of labour intensive products such as 
electrical and electronic products, leather goods, ceramics, footwear, toys and plastics.  
The net barter terms of trade (NBTT) for total manufactures increased by slightl;y 
over seven percent p.a.  
 
 
Beyond the Endowment Thesis 
 
Though the endowment thesis argues the structure of exports is exogenously 
determined, policy can be crucial in helping a country realise this potential. Wood and 
Meyer (1998) find a wide dispersion of actual from predicted manufactured export 
shares, for example Zimbabwe being much higher, and Uganda and Malawi much 
lower than predicted by endowments.   
 
Wood and Jordan (2000) argue that many African countries are not exporting even 
what would be suggested by their endowments.  In 1990 a third of exports from 
Zimbabwe were manufactured and only one percent from Uganda.  This despite 
similar land/skill ratios, being both tropical and landlocked and undergoing 
liberalisation in the 1990s.  The difference is policy induced, the poor state of 
transport from Kampala to Mombasa, the more limited road network in Uganda, 
decision to expel the entrepreneurial Asian community in 1973 from Uganda…. 
 
Milner et al (2000) find conventional measures of nominal and effective protection 
have declined in Uganda as a result of liberalisation in the 1990s.  Natural rates of 
protection due to high costs of transport8 lead to a de facto high rate of protection for 
the domestic market.  Natural rates of protection on coffee generate an implicit export 
tax of twenty-five percent, on manufactured foods of one hundred percent.  Despite 
the formal trade liberalisation there is no evidence of increased efficiency at ports, 
shorter delays at borders.  There is thus scope for policy reform to further enable 
export growth. 
 
Other authors have suggested policy can influence exports independently of 
comparative advantage. 
 
Endowments do not wholly explain trade outcome.  Elbadawi (1999) finds Malaysia, 
Indonesia and Thailand have been able to increase their share of manufactured exports 
to higher levels than explained by their skills and relative abundance of natural 
resources.  Using a composite index of transactions costs, proxied by corruption, the 
length of paved roads and number of fax machines in the country, Elbadawi argues, 
 
“transactions costs are major determinants of manufactured exports and that investing 
on reducing these costs generates the highest payoff for the capacity to export 
manufactures.  However, our results also lend support to the view that: real exchange 
                                                          
7 See Athukorala (2000). 
8 Milner et al (2000) use estimates of marine and air shipping costs to construct estimates of natural 
rates of protection. 
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rate-based competitiveness is a pre-requisite for a developing (especially low-income 
developing) country to become a successful exporter of manufactures.” (Elbadawi, 
1999, p13). 
 
Collier (2002) develops a political economy model of comparative advantage, and 
calculates risk corrected incomes of factors of production.  He argues manufacturing 
is the most transactions intensive activity so will be disproportionately effected by a 
poor policy environment.  
 
Sachs and Warner (1997) examine the more general causes of slow growth in SSA 
between 1965 and 1990.  They argue there is no special ‘African’ cause of slow 
growth caused by its peculiar colonial history, ethnic and tribal divisions, climate and 
geography.  Rather they reach an optimistic conclusion, poor policies and institutions 
explain a large share of growth.  Better policies would contribute to stronger 
economic performance.  They identify openness, human capital formation, 
institutional quality and central government savings as being of greater significance 
than the tropical climate and landlocked geography. 
 
Vertical diversification into processing is one possible development strategy to reduce 
reliance on primary commodities and capture a greater proportion of value added. 
Owens and Wood (1997) explain trade outcome based on factor proportions, 
however, the performance of such strategies is mixed even among countries with the 
same endowments. Cramer (1999) argues the case of cashew nut exports from 
Mozambique demonstrates the weakness of conducting the debate at too aggregate a 
level.  In Mozambique argues Cramer the most pressing constraints are internal, 
political rather than economic or technical (i.e. endowment) - the supply of raw 
cashew nuts, infrastructure to connect small firms, lack of new planting.  There is 
scope with the correct policy framework for vertical integration into processes such as 
salting, flavouring and mixing. 
 
 
Governing the Market 
 
Going beyond the endowment approach suggests that policy can directly influence 
comparative advantage.  The ‘governing the market’ approach argues that 
comparative advantage can be actively changed as a policy variable.  This is thus a 
heterodox endowment model of trade.  This approach is derived from the more 
general literature on the developmental state of Amsden (1989, 2001) and Wade 
(1990) and suggests exports can be ‘pushed’ not simply ‘enabled’.  Export structure 
can become endogenous, directly determined by strategic government policy.  A 
selective industrial policy where rewards and assistance are contingent on improved 
(export) performance is crucial.  In effect using a non-liberal method to pursue the 
same end – higher growth of exports. 
 
Lall (1995) notes the weakness of an African supply response in manufacturing output 
and exports despite sustained trade and general liberalisation.   He criticises the 
simplistic belief that markets are efficient and government intervention distortionary 
and argues there are profound market failures9 in the process of acquiring technology 
                                                          
9 Such as externalities that may require central co-ordination, imperfect information, capital market 
failures preventing firms borrowing during the learning phase etc. 
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as a prerequisite to expanding exports.  The process of becoming efficient is slow, 
risky and costly.  Lall calls for a ‘technological capacity’ approach.  Firms face a 
range of inefficiencies and government interventions may be necessary in factor and 
product markets.  Product markets may call for infant industry protection.  
Governments should therefore retain powers to allocate resources, doing so in a clear 
and transparent manner with strict requirements of capability development leading to 
export growth.  Industrial policy should discriminate between activities according to 
different technological needs, focusing on skill development, technology and financial 
and financial support. 
 
The importance of a selective industrial policy, contingent on improved export 
performance has been noted by Mosley et al (1995) and Tsie (1996) in the context of 
SSA and even by the World Bank (1993) in the case of East Asia. 
 
 
The Three Schools 
 
Despite the apparent conflicting analysis of each school they share a basic similarity.  
The underlying ‘export optimism’ of the governed market approach does not differ 
from that of the minimalist or market conforming approaches.  All three approaches 
are optimistic in the sense they believe higher exports from LDCs are both desirable 
and possible.  They differ substantially from Bruton (1998) who argues in contrast for 
a ‘reconsideration of import substitution’.  The belief (or not) in the efficacy of the 
state to improve economic outcomes has been made without a broader consideration 
of the external framework in which intervention or laissez faire occurs. 
 
 
Domestic Policy Reform in Developed Countries 
 
In addition all three schools agree policy reform in developed countries is necessary 
to maximise the potential for export growth from LDCs.  This analysis of the external 
framework is tacked on as a bit of an afterthought.  We have already seen that once 
the question of the fallacy of composition is broached the external environment 
becomes all-important.  However in the narrow world of the three export optimist 
schools it can merely enhance what is already positive relationship.  The 1994 
Uruguay Round of the GATT included agriculture for the first time, for which non-
tariff barriers were to be converted to tariffs and reduced10.  The Multi-Fibre 
Arrangement, effecting textiles and clothing is scheduled to be phased out.  However, 
high protection is projected to remain after the round has been implemented, in 
agriculture twenty-four percent, textiles and clothing twelve percent and six percent 
on other manufactures, Anderson et al (2002).  The OECD grants nominal assistance 
to agriculture of $354bn a year, mostly through distortions to market prices.  There is 
still a significant scope for expanded market access for developing countries. 
 
There are also some risks in the possible extended use of safeguard clauses 
(protection to prevent serious disruption to domestic industry) and new non-tariff 
barriers such as eco-labelling. 
 
                                                          
10 A notable exception being Japanese rice. 
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A pertinent example of distortions to comparative advantage caused by policies in 
developed countries is provided Kaplan and Kaplinsky (1999) for the case of 
deciduous canned fruit.  It is a resource and labour intensive activity with a high trade 
ratio, using a large share of local inputs.  South Africa has a distinct comparative 
advantage offering both low costs and high quality.  Protection and subsidies in 
industrially advanced countries have led to producers in Italy and Greece significantly 
displacing South Africa from EU markets. 
 
 
The ‘Fallacy of Composition’ 
 
Every study so far cited has been based on an underlying premise typical to 
economics, they show how openness has been beneficial, or how there has been a 
secular decline in the terms of trade for primary producers based on a ceteris-paribus 
assumption.  Openness is demonstrated to be beneficial with the assumption that all 
else is constant, open and closed economies remain so.  The results are thus context 
dependent.  It is not valid to draw the conclusion that all countries would experience 
the same level of export growth by pursuing export promotion.  The counterfactual is 
rather closed economies moving in unison to greater openness.  
 
This is the ‘fallacy of composition’, first discussed in the context of immiserising 
growth by Bhagwati (1958). 
 
 
The Debate 
 
Little attention has been paid in studies of openness to the constraints on international 
market demand.  Most studies focused on the side of export supply and the impact of 
LDC policy regimes on that supply.  This is odd Wood (1994) provoked a debate of 
profound contemporary relevance, arguing the expansion of exports from the NICs 
had a large impact on unemployment and inequality in developed countries.  
 
 
Market Saturation 
 
Cline (1982) calculated the levels of manufactured exports from LDC’s that would 
have occurred in 1976 if all LDC’s had experienced the same share of exports as 
Hong Kong, South Korea, Singapore and Taiwan (adjusting for normal inter-country 
differences associated with size and level of development).  The hypothetical levels of 
LDC exports were then compared to industrial country consumption at the sectoral 
level to determine the resulting import penetration ratios.  A generalisation of the 
East-Asian export model would have implied a rise in the LDC share of the market 
for manufactured imports from approximately seventeen to over sixty percent for all 
seven industrial countries, and from twenty-seven to over seventy-four percent for the 
US.  Cline argues this would have generated an inevitable political reaction against 
free trade in developed countries. 
 
In the 1960s and 70s Bangladesh, Indonesia, India, Pakistan and China were closed to 
international trade.  In the 1980s they shifted to more open trade regimes.  Between 
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1987 and 1993 developed country imports from low-income countries rose from 
$28bn to $110bn.  Reflecting rapid domestic industrialisation, 
    
“the pace and depth of this new market presence [China] in the USA and Japan is 
astonishing.” (Kaplinsky, 1999, p78) 
 
Hence it is misleading to hold up the East Asian experience as a model for 
development.  It, 
 
“almost certainly cannot be generalised without provoking protectionist response 
ruling out its implementation.” (Cline, 1982, p89). 
 
 
Terms of Trade for LDC Manufactured Exports 
 
In developed countries, wages are not flexible, price declines are not passed on to 
labour.  In LDCs by contrast, price declines are typically passed on, allowing them 
greater scope to compete on the basis of price and preserve profit margins.  
Competition between LDC exporters becomes competition among labour, UNCTAD 
(2000).  Greater price flexibility in LDCs also exerts a downward pressure on their 
prices and terms of trade.  The difference is not as in the early analysis of Prebisch 
inherent in the structure of final markets (income elasticity of demand), but rather in 
factor markets (price flexibility). 
 
In the last two decades there has been increasing competition in international markets 
for labour intensive manufactured goods.  There was a decline in market 
concentration of electronics and electrical goods throughout the 1980s and 90s. The 
concentration in clothing declined continuously from the late 1980s.  Finished 
products from technology intensive activities such as machinery or transport 
equipment (aircraft, ships) remain among those with the highest and increasing 
concentration of export market shares.  These developments are in line with LDC 
participation in the production and export of labour intensive manufactures.  The first 
tier NIC’s accounted for two-thirds of all clothing exports from LDC’s during first 
half of the 1980s, their share later dropping to one fifth.  
 
Electronics in the first tier NIC’s were responsible for most of the spectacular increase 
in the share of LDC in world exports between the 1980s and the mid-1990s.  More 
recently Mexico and China have been increasing their market shares.  Growing price 
competition in these products, especially for semi-conductors has exposed traditional 
LDC exporters to competition from lower cost producers.   
 
The clearest exception to the traditional stylised view of Prebisch and Singer is the 
fall in the price of IT goods, though these are technologically advanced manufactures, 
it is relatively easy to establish new small-scale production facilities and difficult for 
large producers to establish a monopoly position11. 
 
 
Manufactured Goods: Evidence 
                                                          
11 Nolan (2001, p134-144) argues instead that there is growing market concentration in the IT sector. 
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Evidence suggests that openness is increasingly associated with declining terms of 
trade.  Sarkar and Singer (1991) extend the framework of Prebisch and Singer to the 
exchange of manufactured exports.  Between 1970 and 1987 the unit value of 
manufactures exported by LDCs as a group declined by one percent per annum 
relative to those of developed countries.  This was offset by a sharp increase in 
volume, generating a ten-percent average increase in the income terms of trade.   
 
By the mid-1990s China had become a major source of imports in a number of 
commodities.  Wood (1997) suggests the speed and scale of this penetration of world 
markets resulted in a twenty percent decline in the terms of trade for LDC 
manufactured exports.  Maizels, Palaskas and Crowe (1998) analysed the unit values 
of manufactured imports and exports between the EU and developing countries 
between 1979 and 1994.  The technology leaders, the U.S. and Japan experienced a 
slightly favourable trend in their manufactures terms of trade with the EU.  They 
found a moderately negative trend for East and South East Asian exports (minus one 
percent) and for other African, Caribbean and Pacific economies a strongly negative 
(minus five percent per annum) trend.  Maizels (2000) found that the terms of trade of 
developing countries with respect to the U.S. had significantly worsened between 
1981 and 1996.  Though this was dominated by changes in trade volume, induced by 
the huge U.S. trade deficit.  Zheng and Zhao (2002) found that China’s net barter 
terms of trade in manufactures had declined by more than ten percent between 1993 
and 2000.  This decline was greater vis-à-vis developed than developing countries and 
less pronounced for traditional labour intensive manufactures than those of medium 
and high technology intensity such as computers and office equipment, 
telecommunications equipment and semi-conductors, those sectors in which China’s 
participation in world trade has grown most rapidly. 
 
This empirical evidence that global competition for labour intensive manufactures has 
risen recently coincides with the shift in the 1980s of several large LDCs towards 
export orientation.  This has resulted in intensified clustering in labour intensive 
manufactured exports and increased market competition.   
 
So far falling terms of trade have been more than offset by increasing volume.  While 
studies of ‘openness’ have tended to tack on proposals for developed countries to 
further liberalise markets to maximise the benefits from openness.  In practise we find 
the beneficial effects of export growth (volume) entirely determined by growth in 
high-income countries.   
 
 
The Optimists 
 
Ranis (1985) was optimistic.  The different initial conditions of LDC’s (size and 
factor endowments) and policy postures means that ‘export led industrialisation’ 
would imply producing different goods at different points in time.  NIC’s gaining 
economic maturity, moving up the production ladder and leaving room for 
newcomers.  Terms of trade movement are thus at least partly endogenous to the 
export growth process, export success can generate terms of trade improvement over 
time. 
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Those developing countries with natural resource endowment e.g. Brazil and 
Argentina are likely to remain with a strong raw material basis to exports and a 
permanently lower manufactured export share than small, resource poor city states. 
Large LDC’s such as Indonesia, India, China are unlikely to rely on foreign markets 
to the same extent as the first generation NIC’s who were compelled to expand 
exports to earn foreign exchange for capital goods imports and raw materials e.g. oil. 
 
The pessimistic also view neglects the potential of an increasing share of exports 
going to markets in the south.  Higher income growth among middle income countries 
will generate a more than proportionate increase in south-south trade.  
 
Income growth will generate expanded export growth from the north alleviating 
protectionist sentiments, generating a greater tolerance for worker displacement and 
also specific anti-protectionist countervailing political pressure – e.g. by the 
agricultural lobby in the U.S. 
 
It is also important to increase market access conditions for these products, the pace at 
which the more advanced developing countries diversify their own production 
structures away from low skilled exports, and how quickly developed country 
producers move out of low skill products. The flying geese pattern of development 
can also help avert the fallacy of composition and protectionism by expanding south-
south trade in manufactures and allowing newcomers some space in the markets of 
industrial countries. 
 
Income inequality and unemployment in developed countries is likely to supplement 
pressure for protection.  Complementary policies such as training and education will 
help labour mobility between sectors in developed countries. The contemporary 
export penetration of NIC’s is not without precedence, between 1958 and 1975 the 
export penetration of goods from Japan and Italy into the US and (five member) EEC 
was on a comparable scale.  This was not associated with labour market problems.  
By contrast the period also saw a large migration of labour.  Rapid and sustained 
growth and full employment in HIC’s was crucial for averting potential problems. 
 
Far from export growth being a function of domestic policies in LDC’s we are 
moving rapidly to the conclusion that the benefits of openness are dependent on 
domestic policy in developed countries. Export optimism is based on the (implicit) 
hope that the international economy will remain favourable. 
 
 
Marx, Rents and Competition 
 
It is a standard proposition that where barriers to entry are low, resultant competition 
will drive prices and profits down.  Long term growth will then be dependent on 
upgrading to less competitive market niches to capture rents, e.g. from clothing to 
electronics to IT.  Amsden (1989, 2001) argues that for late industrialisers learning is 
more important than innovation.  Rents are dynamic firms fight to raise productivity 
and learning faster than the decline in margins as competitive pressures intensify.  
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”In the context of a competitive environment these rents can only be appropriated 
through a strategy which sustains upgrading at a higher pace than competitor 
economies.” (Kaplinsky, 1999, p77). 
 
To orthodox economists supply and demand adjust smoothly.  Following a decline in 
profit rates in an oversupplied market producers will cut back on production and exit 
the industry until profits have been restored to a normal level.  For the export 
optimists the correct policy is to pursue export promotion regardless.  This has an 
evident echo of Marx’s analysis of the secular tendency to over-production in 
capitalism.  For Marx the capitalist is rather compelled to introduce new methods of 
production under the pressure of competition.  To reduce costs, allow the capitalist to 
sell below the costs of other capitalists and capture market share.  The driving force of 
capitalist production is the need for capitalists to constantly invest in new methods of 
production to exploit the possibility of earning a surplus profit and meet the threat of 
other capitalists doing the same thing.  Rather than supply falling in response to 
falling profits it increases and initiates a dynamic of overproduction.  There is a 
contradiction between the production of surplus value and the realisation of the 
surplus value through sale of use values.  A contradiction between the social relations 
and the forces of production.  Overproduction is the means by which less efficient 
producers are forced out of the market.  It is not just an accident of competition but is 
its essential form in a capitalist economy. 
 
There is a continual tendency towards the commoditisation of product and factor 
markets.  The mid-1990s witnessed a massive investment boom in Asia’s electronics 
industry, and subsequent oversupply and price collapse. The continued growth of 
world trade is thus crucial.  Korea suffered from a dependence on a single export, 
Dynamic Random Export Memories (DRAM’s).  As DRAM’s became increasingly 
commoditised during the 1990s, the price declined and the trade balance plunged into 
deficits that provided the backdrop to the 1997 crisis.  From a surplus on current 
account of $0.4bn in 1993, Korea lurched into a $4.5bn deficit in 1994, $8.9bn in 
1995 and $23.7bn in 1996, Kaplinsky (1999). 
 
“The more powerful and costly means of production that he has called into life enable 
him, indeed, to sell his commodities more cheaply, they compel him, however at the 
same time to sell more commodities, to conquer a much larger market for his 
commodities; consequently our capitalist will sell his half yard of linen more cheaply 
than his competitors…..He drives them from the field, he wrests from them at least 
part of their sales, by underselling them…However, the privileged position of our 
capitalist is not of long duration; other competing capitalists introduce the same 
machines…on the same or on a larger scale, and this introduction will become so 
general that the price of linen is reduced not only below its old, but below its new 
costs of production.” (Marx, quoted in Clarke, 1994, p87). 
 
There is a curious contradiction in the literature.  Policies to increase competition and 
atomisation, to increase export orientation (share of output exported) of individual 
economies are held to coincide with general export growth (higher volume).  Marx  
pointed out that greater levels of production are typically associated with greater 
centralisation and concentration of capital.  Marx argued the dynamic of over-
accumulation and crisis is the specific mechanism through which new methods of 
production are introduced and generalised within the capitalist system.  This generates 
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a historical tendency to centralisation and concentration of capital, in order to reduce 
crises by reducing competition. 
 
“The attempt to maintain the rate of profit in the face……and the growing scale of 
production leads to an intensification of the competitive struggle, leading in turn to 
the further concentration and centralisation of capital and the further development of 
the forces of production and expansion of productive capacity, which further 
intensifies competitive pressure in a cumulative spiral.” (Marx, quoted in Clarke, 
1994, p242). 
 
 
Value Chain Analysis and Regional Trading Arrangements 
 
We can identify two tendencies in the world economy and better explain them within 
the context of falling terms of trade, growing centralisation of capital and the stirrings 
of a developing world response.  The increasing integration of capital into ‘value 
chains’ and the formation of regional trading arrangements.  Both can be related to the 
crisis tendencies of competition for rents. 
 
 
Value Chain Analysis 
 
“The value chain describes the full range of activities that are required to bring a 
product from its conception, through its design, its sourced raw materials and 
intermediate inputs, its marketing, its distribution and its support to the final 
consumer.  In other words the chain can be seen as incorporating production, 
exchange, distribution and consumption from the cradle to the grave of a given 
product or service.” (IDS, 2001, p1). 
 
Many chains are characterised by a dominant party12 who become responsible for 
upgrading activities within individual links and co-ordinating interaction between the 
links.  There is a necessary distinction between co-ordination undertaken by buyers  
(buyer-driven commodity chains) and circumstances where producers take the key 
role (producer driven commodity chains).  Buyer-driven chains are characteristic of 
labour intensive industries such as furniture, footwear, clothing and toys.  Producer-
driven chains see the producer take more responsibility for promoting the efficiency 
of downstream suppliers.  The relationship is more likely to be based on foreign direct 
investment.  Trade in final products manufactured locally and exported is being 
replaced by more complex trade in sub-components and services. 
 
In many sectors value added (economic rents) is found increasingly in design, buying, 
marketing rather than production itself.  As more countries have developed their 
capacities in industrial activities, barriers to entry in production have fallen and 
competitive pressures have heightened.  Barriers to entry determine the distribution of 
rents. Rents are increasingly located in the intangible parts of the value chain.  
                                                          
12 Nolan (2001, p119-122) calls this party the ‘core systems integrator’. 
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Copyright and brand names (seventy years and perpetuity) represent immutable forms 
of economic rent13, Kaplinsky (2000).   
 
The value chain is an effort to simultaneously monopolise rents and benefit from 
falling terms of trade.  The fallacy of competition results from the global spread of 
capabilities in manufacturing.   Dolan at al (2000) examine the role of UK food 
retailers in a buyer driven global commodity chains.  A critical role in defining what 
is produced, how and by whom is played by large supermarket chains in the U.K.  
The four largest chains account for nearly three-quarters of all food sales in the UK.  
They have increasingly developed their own brands in competition with more 
established names.  The largest UK retailers control between seventy and ninety 
percent of fresh produce imports from Africa.  The key driving process in the 
distribution of activities is the decision of supermarkets to concentrate on core 
retailing and to look for ways to reduce costs, passing back the risks of procurement, 
processing and quality to downstream actors in the chain.   
 
Many former supermarket functions, quality control, logistics, storage, distribution, 
and transport have been pushed back.  African exporters now conduct basic tasks such 
as washing and trimming, and also more technically complicated tasks such as bar 
coding and labelling.  The requirements of UK supermarkets for quality and 
consistency, reliability of supply, cost, variety, value added and innovation have 
favoured concentration in a few large firms. Small and medium sized exporters and 
small growers have been marginalised. 
 
The supermarket chains have focused on retaining a monopoly in areas of high value 
added and using the pressure of competition and falling terms of trade to 
institutionalise their capture of surplus. 
 
 
Regional Trading Arrangements 
 
By contrast to the vertical integration of value chains, regional arrangements are 
seeking to further the horizontal integration of economies in trade blocs of varying 
description. 
 
The World Bank has in recent years adopted a more favourable tone with regards 
regional trade arrangements, endorsing them in eastern and southern Africa.  Such 
endorsement is really of little substance, integration is treated as a means to extend 
liberalisation to the regional level.  This narrow trade focus contrasts with the more 
ambitious inetgrationist political agendas of early SADC to reduce dependence on 
apartheid South Africa or even 1950s vintage EEC to reduce the risk of European 
war. 
 
There are concerns that trade blocs are seen as part of broader liberalisation.  The 
SADC trade protocol of September 2000 agrees to completely eliminate tariffs and 
NTB’s on intra-SADC trade by 2012.  Without harmonisation of external tariffs there 
is a danger of tariff jumping.  Therefore an elaborate system of rules of origin have 
                                                          
13 It is not surprising the developed world has moved intellectual property rights to the centre of 
multilateral trade discussions in recent years. 
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been developed to overcome this potential problem.  Flatters (2001) highlights 
concern that small high cost producers in the SADC region will be able to gain 
preferential access to the SADC market on the basis of their national origin.  The 
vision of integration he argues should be directed outwards beyond the region, using 
inputs from the lowest cost source, or SADC markets will risk becoming irrelevant to 
the regions exporters.  
 
Regional economic integration and consolidation of production would provide a 
crucial mechanism for LDC’s to avoid exposure to falling terms of trade at the bottom 
of the value chain.  By taking advantage of the fact that (for example) Sub-Saharan 
Africa collectively supplies a significant proportion of world production in a number 
of commodities.  Weeks (1996) challenges the view that endowments in Sub-Saharan 
Africa are too similar to generate scope for regional trade.  There is sufficient 
variation he argues in per capita incomes, urbanisation, land availability, rainfall 
conditions and consumption patterns to generate potential gains from integration. 
 
Integration would also allow LDC’s to exert bargaining influence in multilateral 
organisations, to donors and FDI.  Without co-operation investors are better able to 
extract concessions on taxes, labour regulations and subsidies.  Such tax competition 
may eventually lead to the burden of taxation being shifted to immobile factors 
(unskilled labour) as economies compete to host mobile (capital and skilled labour) 
factors.  Nolan (2001) notes the emerging political response to the 1997 Asian crisis 
can be interpreted in these terms.  As ASEAN creates its own free trade area there 
may also be greater space for more extensive co-operation on financial and industrial 
policy, crucially including cross-border mergers and acquisitions.  A regionally based 
and integrated East Asia would provide a significant commercial challenge to the 
dominant corporations from the developed world.  A sign of the times was the 
announcement in August 2000 of greater co-operation between POSCO (South 
Korea) and Nippon Steel (Japan)14, including cross-ownership to help prevent hostile 
take-overs, pooling resources in R+D, and co-operation in joint ventures overseas. 
 
Regional integration, consolidation and trade offer developing countries the 
opportunity to avoid the strangulation of value chains and a, 
 
“….Malthusian closure of globalisation in which the openness of economies drives 
real wages to the rate of subsistence in much of the global economy.  Particularly in 
those economies concentrating on the realisation of comparative advantage through 
specialisation in labour intensive commodities.  A race to the bottom remains a 
realistic outcome to globalisation.” (Kaplinsky, 1999, p83). 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
                                                          
14 The two world leaders in steel production. 
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The analysis of export optimism takes place in a surprising vacuum15 despite what on 
the surface appear to be three radically different schools.  Uniting all three is the 
emphasis on domestic reform being necessary to increase the volume of exports.  This 
they argue is both possible and desirable.  The fallacy of competition once introduced 
is not integrated with this analysis and its detractors (the fallacy optimists) quietly 
drop discussion of domestic policy reform in LDC’s when they argue the threat is not 
a real one.  Instead positing a dependence on continued market growth in developed 
countries.  Once co-joined these two debates bare a striking similarity to the questions 
of competition and accumulation that Marx analysed in the context of the domestic 
economy.  Once considered in this wider context we uncover a new perspective on the 
issues of value chain analysis and regional integration that is otherwise missed.  
Perhaps it is premature to term this a ‘last sigh’, and even not doing the topic justice 
to think of it in such deflationary terms but a new and contemporary relevance I think 
it is indeed for the Moor. 
 
“The first sign of this bizarre reassessment appeared in October 1997, when a special 
issue of the New Yorker billed Karl Marx as ‘the next big thinker’, a man with much 
to teach us about political corruption, monopolisation, alienation and global markets.”  
(Wheen, 1999, p5). 
                                                          
15 The contemporary relevance of the fallacy of composition is heightened by the accession of China to 
the WTO and consequent reduction in constraints on a range of labour intensive exports, notably 
clothing and textiles. 
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